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

POLICY PAPER · EPIC-PP-2026-040

After the Coups

JNIM, Islamic State and the Central Sahel, 2020 to Mid-2026

EPIC Research Team

November 2026

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EPIC-PP-2026-040 · Extremism & Political Islam · 2 November 2026 · EPIC Research Team

Abstract

Between August 2020 and July 2023, military officers took power in Mali (twice), Burkina Faso (twice) and Niger (UN Security Council 2020; 2021; 2022a; 2022b; UN Secretary-General 2023). The new authorities brought the French military presence to an end and, in Mali's case, the UN peacekeeping mission too. The last soldier of France's Operation Barkhane left Mali on 15 August 2022 (Élysée 2022). The Security Council ended the mandate of the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 30 June 2023 at Mali's request, and the mission closed on 31 December 2023 (UN Security Council 2023; 2024). The three states formed a confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), on 6 July 2024, and their withdrawal from ECOWAS took effect on 29 January 2025 (Présidence du Faso 2024; ECOWAS 2025a). Over the same years the armed groups grew stronger. The UN sanctions Monitoring Team's thirty-eighth report, issued on 10 August 2026, calls Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaida's Sahel affiliate, "the leading terrorist threat in the Sahel" and estimates its strength at 7,000 to 8,000 members, about half of them in Mali (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 12). It puts the Islamic State's Sahel branch at around 2,000 members (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 21). On 25 April 2026 JNIM, with the Front de libération de l'Azawad (FLA), launched a coordinated offensive across Mali. In the attack on Kati, Mali's defence minister was killed (UN Security Council 2026b, paras 13 to 15). The Global Terrorism Index 2026, which covers calendar year 2025, ranks Burkina Faso second, Niger third and Mali fifth in the world (IEP 2026, 6). It records falls in terrorism deaths in all three countries in 2025, yet still finds that the Sahel accounted for more than half of all terrorism deaths worldwide that year (IEP 2026, 4). The UN counts 2.8 million internally displaced people in Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger as of 9 September 2026 (OCHA 2026b). The conflict touches Gulf interests directly. The Monitoring Team reports that in September 2025 a member of the royal family of a Gulf Cooperation Council member state was abducted in a JNIM kidnapping, and that the ransom "reportedly approximated $50 million" (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 107). Its next report states that most of this ransom was redistributed among JNIM units and played a key role in financing the 2026 offensive (UN Security Council 2026b, paras 9 and 16). The UN reports do not name the state concerned, and neither does this paper.

Keywords: Sahel; Burkina Faso; Mali; Niger; JNIM; Islamic State Sahel Province; coups; Alliance of Sahel States; terrorism; displacement; coastal West Africa; Global Terrorism Index; UAE

1. Scope, sources and method

The paper covers the three central Sahel states, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, from the August 2020 coup in Mali to mid-2026, with later UN reporting where it describes events up to July 2026. It also covers the spread of the two jihadist groups southward into Benin, Togo and neighbouring coastal states. It does not cover the Lake Chad basin except where a source links it to the Sahel groups. It does not revisit the Muslim Brotherhood, which EPIC treats in separate papers, or Red Sea maritime security, which EPIC paper 020 covers.

The paper draws on four kinds of source, each measuring something different.

- **UN Security Council Monitoring Team reports.** The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports twice a year to the Security Council committee on ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qaida. Its reports rest on information supplied by member states. The two newest are the thirty-seventh report (S/2026/44, 4 February 2026) and the thirty-eighth report (S/2026/651, 10 August 2026) (UN Security Council 2026a; 2026b).
- **The Global Terrorism Index (GTI).** The newest edition is the Global Terrorism Index 2026, published by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) in Sydney in March 2026. It scores and ranks countries on terrorism in calendar year 2025, using Dragonfly's TerrorismTracker database of incidents reported in open sources (IEP 2026, front matter). Page numbers below are the printed page numbers of that report.
- **ACLED.** The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project publishes analysis free of charge. This paper uses only its public reports and monthly overviews. It does not use ACLED's event-level data.
- **UN and government statements.** These include OCHA's regional overview, Security Council and Secretary-General press statements, ECOWAS statements, French government releases, a Burkina Faso presidency release on the AES, and statements by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

Every source counts violence its own way. The GTI counts terrorist incidents and deaths. ACLED counts political violence events of all kinds. OCHA counts security incidents and people killed across the region. Their totals differ and cannot be added together or compared directly, so every figure in this paper carries its source and period.

Names differ too. The UN sanctions list calls the Islamic State's Sahel branch "Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, QDe.163)" (UN Security Council 2026b, summary and para. 20). ACLED calls the same group "Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)" (ACLED 2026d). This paper follows each source's usage.

Statements marked "EPIC assessment" are the EPIC Research Team's own inferences from the cited facts and should not be read as findings of any source.

2. From coups to confederation, 2020 to 2025

2.1 Five coups in three years

On 18 August 2020, mutineers in Kati arrested Mali's President, Prime Minister and several members of the Government. The Security Council condemned the mutiny the next day (UN Security Council 2020). On 24 May 2021, elements of Mali's defence and security forces arrested the transitional President and Prime Minister, which the Council condemned as an attempt to impose "a change of transitional leadership by force" (UN Security Council 2021).

In Burkina Faso, the Council expressed "serious concern" about the unconstitutional change of government of 24 January 2022, and noted that ECOWAS and the African Union had suspended the country (UN Security Council 2022a). A second takeover followed on 30 September 2022. The Council called it "the second military takeover in Burkina Faso in eight months" and said the instability gave "an opportunity for terrorist groups to wreak havoc" (UN Security Council 2022b).

In Niger, on 26 July 2023, the UN Secretary-General condemned "any effort to seize power by force" (UN Secretary-General 2023).

2.2 The French and UN drawdown

France decided on 17 February 2022 to move Operation Barkhane out of Mali, saying the political and operational conditions for staying were no longer met. The last French soldier of the operation left Mali on 15 August 2022 (Élysée 2022). In Niger, on 24 September 2023, the French President ordered the repatriation of the forces deployed there, citing the end of military cooperation with Niger. The armed forces ministry announced on 5 October 2023 that the withdrawal had begun and was planned to finish before the end of that year (Ministère des Armées 2023).

Responding directly to Mali's request, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2690 (2023) on 30 June 2023, ending MINUSMA's mandate from that day. The mission had to cease operations and withdraw its personnel by 31 December 2023. Its authority to respond to imminent threats of violence to civilians ran only until 30 September 2023 (UN Security Council 2023). According to the UN record of the meeting, Mali's representative acknowledged that the mission had not achieved its fundamental objective of supporting the Government's efforts to secure the country (UN Security Council 2023).

MINUSMA closed on 31 December 2023 after ten years. The Council paid tribute to the 311 mission personnel who lost their lives (UN Security Council 2024). UN News describes the mission as having included more than 15,000 troops and personnel (UN News 2023).

2.3 The Alliance of Sahel States and the break with ECOWAS

At their first summit in Niamey on 6 July 2024, the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger adopted the treaty creating the Confederation "Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES)" (Présidence du Faso 2024). The Burkina Faso presidency lists the confederation's principles:

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression among member states, a ban on coercive measures, and solidarity (Présidence du Faso 2024).

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS took effect on 29 January 2025. On the same day ECOWAS asked authorities to keep recognising the three countries' passports and identity cards bearing the ECOWAS logo. It also asked them to keep treating the three countries' goods under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme and to keep visa-free movement for their citizens, "until further notice" (ECOWAS 2025a). The President of the ECOWAS Commission said he had proposed a technical meeting with each state on the terms of separation (ECOWAS 2025b).

EPIC assessment: the sources show a clear sequence. The coups came first. The French and UN forces then left at the request of the new authorities, and the AES and the ECOWAS exit formalised the break with former partners. ACLED describes the Benin, Niger and Nigeria borderlands as a zone where these geopolitical changes coincide with "weakened regional cooperation, and limited border security coordination" (ACLED 2026a). The sources reviewed here do not establish how much of the groups' growth was caused by the departure of foreign forces, and this paper makes no claim on that point.

Figure 1. Coups, foreign withdrawals and major attacks in the central Sahel, August 2020 to April 2026



Dates are as given in the cited statements. The September 2025 entry is month-only (hollow marker) and is plotted at mid-month.
Chart: EPIC Research Team.
Sources: UN Security Council 2020, 2021, 2022a, 2022b, 2023, 2024, 2026a, para 16, 2026b, paras 13–15, 22; UN Secretary-General 2023; Élysée 2022; Ministère des Armées 2023; Présidence du Faso 2024; ECOWAS 2025a.

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3. The armed groups in 2025 and 2026

3.1 JNIM

ACLED dates JNIM's founding to March 2017, as a merger of four existing groups linked to al-Qaida (ACLED 2025). The Monitoring Team's latest estimate is 7,000 to 8,000 members, around half of them in Mali (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 12).

From September 2025 JNIM enforced a fuel blockade on Bamako, targeting fuel convoys from neighbouring countries, destroying "hundreds of tankers" (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 16). At the time the Monitoring Team judged that JNIM lacked the capacity to occupy Bamako and was likely to use the blockade to try to force the Government into negotiations (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 17). The same report describes JNIM attacks on mining sites and industrial facilities operated by foreign investors, and on key logistics routes (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 15).

On 25 April 2026, JNIM launched a coordinated offensive across several regions of Mali, planned and conducted with the Tuareg-majority FLA. The Monitoring Team assesses that the group's immediate aim was to increase pressure on the authorities and consolidate its influence in northern and central Mali, and that it did not set out to overthrow the Government or seize Bamako (UN Security Council 2026b, paras 13 and 14). JNIM and the FLA regained control over parts of northern Mali, including Kidal, and operations reached Bamako and the garrison town of Kati. In Kati, the Minister of Defence was killed by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 15). ACLED reports that the Malian army and Africa Corps withdrew from most of the Kidal region after the offensive, and that JNIM announced a blockade on Bamako (ACLED 2026b).

In Burkina Faso, JNIM claimed over 130 attacks in 2026 and moved closer to Ouagadougou, according to the thirty-eighth report (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 20). The GTI attributes 1,274 deaths in 2025 to JNIM across four countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, making it the second deadliest terrorist group of that year. Of these deaths, 755 were in Burkina Faso (IEP 2026, 17).

The UN and ACLED both report rapid growth in JNIM's use of drones. ACLED records JNIM armed drone strikes rising from fewer than 10 in 2024 to around 80 in 2025 (ACLED 2026b). The Monitoring Team describes JNIM as having the most advanced drone capability among ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qaida affiliates in the Sahel and West Africa. It adds that strikes "remained rudimentary", typically dropping improvised munitions such as 60 mm mortar shells (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 129). JNIM also used dozens of commercial satellite communication terminals to coordinate its units (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 17).

3.2 The Islamic State in the Sahel

The Monitoring Team assesses the Islamic State's Sahel branch at around 2,000 members, "militarily inferior to JNIM" but a growing threat. Niger accounted for 75 per cent of its claimed attacks in 2026 (UN Security Council 2026b, paras 21 and 22). On 29 January 2026, around 40

of its fighters attacked Niamey international airport and destroyed two light aircraft, one fighter jet and one helicopter. The Islamic State's West Africa Province played a key role in preparing the operation (UN Security Council 2026b, paras 22 and 23).

The GTI records that Islamic State claimed 33 attacks causing 416 deaths in Niger in 2025, up from 12 attacks and 108 deaths in 2024 (IEP 2026, 22). ACLED reports simultaneous attacks by the group on military positions in In-Ates and Banibangou in western Niger on 17 June 2026 (ACLED 2026d).

3.3 Rivalry between the two groups

The two groups have fought a turf war since early 2020 in central Mali and in the Liptako-Gourma border area of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (ACLED 2025). A détente earlier in 2025 ended with clashes between August and October 2025 (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 22). By mid-2026 the Monitoring Team described their relations as "open competition". It reported that the Islamic State branch claimed to have killed nearly 100 JNIM members in Niger and Burkina Faso between February and April 2026 (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 24). ACLED expects this competition to push both groups towards "more visible and high-impact operations against strategic targets and critical infrastructure" (ACLED 2026b).

ACLED describes western Niger as the main battleground between the two in mid-2026. JNIM's attack on Niamey airport on 18 June 2026 was repelled. On 30 June it launched coordinated assaults in Niger and in Burkina Faso, most of which were repelled. Burkinabe authorities claimed to have killed at least 400 militants (ACLED 2026d). The figure is a government claim, reported by ACLED and not independently confirmed.

3.4 What the Global Terrorism Index measures

The GTI 2026 shows terrorism deaths falling in 2025 in all three central Sahel states:

- Burkina Faso: 846 deaths in 2025, down 45 per cent from 1,532 in 2024 (IEP 2026, 21).
- Niger: 703 deaths in 2025, down 26 per cent from 944 in 2024 (IEP 2026, 22).
- Mali: 341 deaths from 106 attacks in 2025, a 42 per cent fall in deaths from 2024 (IEP 2026, 24).

Figure 2. Deaths from terrorism in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, 2024 and 2025



Mali's 2024 total is not stated in the source (n/a); no bar is shown.
Global Terrorism Index figures draw on Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, a third-party dataset; counts are third-party estimates.
Chart: EPIC Research Team.
Source: IEP 2026, pp. 21–22, 24.

Figure 2. Deaths from terrorism in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, 2024 and 2025

Source: IEP 2026, pp. 21–22, 24.

The same report finds that the Sahel accounted for more than half of all terrorism deaths worldwide in 2025, against under one per cent in 2007 (IEP 2026, 4). It ranks Burkina Faso second, Niger third and Mali fifth of all countries (IEP 2026, 6).

Figure 3. Global Terrorism Index 2026: rank and score, Sahel, coastal West Africa and Gulf



A lower rank number means a higher impact of terrorism. Scores run from 0 (no impact) to 10.
Ghana's score of 0 (rank 100) is a published value.
The UAE and Switzerland share a score of 0.749; the GTI's p. 6 table ranks the UAE 68th, while its regional table and annex rank it 67th.
Chart: EPIC Research Team.
Source: IEP 2026, pp. 6–7.

Figure 3. Global Terrorism Index 2026: rank and score, Sahel, coastal West Africa and Gulf

Source: IEP 2026, pp. 6–7.

EPIC assessment: the GTI's falling death counts for 2025 do not show the threat receding. The GTI itself says JNIM's true numbers of incidents and deaths are "likely higher" because attacks in rural parts of the central Sahel are hard to attribute (IEP 2026, 17). The UN reports for 2025 and 2026 describe expansion, a fuel blockade and a major offensive in the same period (UN Security Council 2026a, paras 13 to 16; 2026b, paras 12 to 15). The GTI is best read as a measure of attributed terrorist incidents, a narrower thing than overall conflict violence.

4. The humanitarian toll

OCHA's regional overview as of 9 September 2026 covers Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger (OCHA 2026b). It records:

- 3,272 security incidents in which 8,015 people were killed between January and August 2026;
- 2.8 million internally displaced people, of whom 2.1 million are in Burkina Faso, 415,000 in Mali and 347,000 in Niger, as well as 448,000 refugees;
- 2.7 million people facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), and about 660,000 children with severe acute malnutrition;
- 3,794 schools and 974 health facilities not functioning;
- more than 11.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2026.

The country displacement figures are rounded, so they do not add up to the rounded total.

Figure 4. Internally displaced people and refugees in Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger, 2026



Country figures are rounded and do not sum to the rounded total.
Chart: EPIC Research Team.
Source: OCHA, Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger humanitarian overview, as of 9 September 2026.

Figure 4. Internally displaced people and refugees in Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger, 2026

Source: OCHA, Burkina Faso, Mali and western Niger humanitarian overview, as of 9 September 2026.

The 2026 humanitarian requirement for the region is US$351 million, of which 18 per cent had been funded as of 9 September 2026 (OCHA 2026b).

5. Spillover to coastal West Africa

ACLED traces JNIM's southward expansion from eastern Burkina Faso into Benin from 2021 and Togo from 2022. The group has entrenched itself in the W-Arly-Pendjari protected area, including Park W, on the Benin-Niger border (ACLED 2025). The Monitoring Team reports that a senior JNIM figure in Burkina Faso was appointed head of JNIM in eastern Burkina Faso and charged with expanding its presence in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger and Togo. A separate emir was named for Benin (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 14).

Benin. A JNIM unit, Katiba Hanifa, operates in the Alibori, Borgou and Atacora departments of northern Benin. It attacks security posts and patrols, and intimidates or abducts villagers (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 21). ACLED compared 2024 with 2025 in the borderland regions of Benin's Alibori and Borgou, Niger's Dosso, and Nigeria's Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger and Kwara states. In those areas, violent events involving jihadist groups rose by 86 per cent and related fatalities by 262 per cent (ACLED 2026a). ACLED also describes 2025 as the deadliest year to date in Benin (ACLED 2026a). In 2026 JNIM claimed six attacks in northern Benin and began recruiting locally (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 20). ACLED's June 2026 overview reports a coordinated JNIM attack on military positions in Koualou, a town in an area disputed by Benin and Burkina Faso (ACLED 2026c). The GTI 2026 ranks Benin 19th, up eight places, and Togo 30th, down five places (IEP 2026, 6).

Nigeria. JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October 2025, killing a soldier in Kwara State near the Benin border. The Monitoring Team judged this attack opportunistic (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 21). The Islamic State's Sahel branch has spread from Sokoto into Kebbi and Zamfara States, partly by recruiting hundreds of people linked to the Lakurawa (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 26).

Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. The Monitoring Team describes these three states as "transit and logistical zones rather than ... targets for attacks" (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 20). The GTI 2026 gives Ghana a score of zero and Côte d'Ivoire a score of 0.702, ranking it 71st (IEP 2026, 6 and 7).

EPIC assessment: official and research sources agree on the direction of travel. Neither the UN nor ACLED reports a sustained campaign in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire or Senegal as of mid-2026. The risk to those states, on the cited evidence, lies in their use as transit and supply areas.

6. Gulf and UAE interests

This section sticks to what the sources state. Where the paper draws a conclusion of its own, it is marked as an EPIC assessment.

6.1 Kidnapping for ransom

The Monitoring Team reports that JNIM kidnapped foreign nationals at a rising rate in 2025. From May to October 2025 the number of foreign nationals kidnapped nearly doubled, to 22 cases (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 107). In September 2025, "a member of the royal family of a State Member of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was abducted". The ransom "reportedly approximated $50 million, with unconfirmed reports that prisoner releases and arms shipments were part of the package" (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 107).

The thirty-eighth report states that most of the approximately $50 million ransom received in 2025 for the release of a hostage was redistributed among JNIM's units. It says these funds "played a key role in financing the group's offensive across Mali", and that a portion went to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 16). It adds that a portion was "likely channelled to the broader Al-Qaida network" (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 9). Neither UN report names the Gulf state concerned or the payer, and this paper does not.

EPIC assessment: on the UN's account, a single ransom linked to a Gulf national became a significant source of financing for the 2026 offensive in Mali. This gives Gulf governments a direct interest in kidnap prevention for their nationals and businesses in the region. Ransom payments to groups on the UN sanctions list are also a matter for the Security Council's sanctions regime. The thirty-seventh report notes that JNIM had attacked mining sites and industrial facilities operated by foreign investors (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 15). The sources reviewed do not identify Gulf-owned assets among the targets.

6.2 UAE public positions

In this period the UAE's public statements on the Sahel condemn terrorist attacks. MoFA condemned:

- the attack on Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, in a statement of 5 February 2026 (UAE MoFA 2026a);
- the attacks of April 2026 on "several cities and military sites" in Mali, in a statement of 27 April 2026 (UAE MoFA 2026b);
- a further attack on the same airport, in a statement of 20 June 2026 (UAE MoFA 2026c).

Each statement repeats the UAE's "permanent rejection of all forms of violence, extremism, and terrorism" (UAE MoFA 2026a; 2026b; 2026c). MoFA's 20 June statement describes the June attack as causing "dozens of deaths and injuries", while ACLED reports that the 18 June JNIM attack on the airport was repelled (UAE MoFA 2026c; ACLED 2026d). This paper does not reconcile the two accounts.

The UAE held the Security Council presidency in June 2023 and voted for resolution 2690 (2023). According to the UN record, its representative said that keeping a UN political office and peacekeepers in Mali without consent would be untenable. She added: "MINUSMA is withdrawing from Mali, but Mali and its people will not be left behind" (UN Security Council 2023).

6.3 Comparative terrorism scores

The GTI 2026 ranks the UAE 68th, with a score of 0.749, and Saudi Arabia 80th, with a score of 0.443, against Burkina Faso's score of 8.324 (IEP 2026, 6). The UAE shares that score with Switzerland, and the GTI's regional table and annex list the UAE 67th (IEP 2026).

EPIC assessment: on the evidence reviewed, Gulf exposure to Sahel jihadism runs through Gulf nationals and commercial interests in the region and through ransom financing that reaches wider al-Qaida networks.

7. Limits of the evidence

- **Member-state information.** The Monitoring Team's figures, such as JNIM's strength and the ransom amount, come from member states. The reports present them as estimates or "reported" figures, and this paper does the same.
- **Different counts.** The GTI, ACLED and OCHA counts measure different things and cover different periods. No total in this paper combines them.
- **ACLED data.** ACLED's event-level data were not used. Figures attributed to ACLED come from its published reports and overviews.
- **Press reports not found.** Press reports on the 2025 kidnapping, which may identify the Gulf state concerned, could not be found on the date of checking. They are not cited, and this paper does not infer the name of the state.
- **No AES security statements.** No AES or Malian government statement on the 2026 offensive was found. Government claims in this paper, such as Burkina Faso's figure of 400 militants killed, are attributed to their source and are unconfirmed.

8. Implications

These points are EPIC assessments drawn from the cited sources.

1. **The threat to Mali.** On the UN's assessment, JNIM's offensive since April 2026 aims at pressure and consolidation rather than seizing Bamako, and in February 2026 member states judged that the group lacked the capacity to occupy the city. Its control of parts of the north and its blockade tactics make the security of Bamako's supply routes the chief near-term test for the Malian authorities (UN Security Council 2026a, para. 17; 2026b, paras 13 to 15).
2. **The coastal belt.** Northern Benin is now an active front, while Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal sit at different points between frontline and transit zone. Regional cooperation has weakened since the AES states left ECOWAS (ECOWAS 2025a; ACLED 2026a; UN Security Council 2026b, para. 20).
3. **Ransoms as a strategic resource.** The UN links one ransom directly to the financing of a national-scale offensive (UN Security Council 2026b, para. 16). For the Gulf states, whose nationals and companies are active in the region, preventing kidnapping and keeping to UN sanctions obligations are the most direct points of exposure.

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EPIC Research Team. Chicago author-date. All links checked 1 Nov 2026. "Route" records where each source was consulted.

Dated source log

Date checked	Key	Route	Status
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2026a	Official site (UN Official Document System)	Found; S/2026/44, dated 4 Feb 2026
2 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2026a	Official site (UN Official Document System)	Opened; same 26-page report at the new link; archived copy made 2 Nov 2026
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2026b	Official site (UN Official Document System)	Found; S/2026/651, dated 10 Aug 2026; identical to the copy on ecoi.net
2 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2026b	Official site (UN Official Document System)	Opened; same 30-page report at the new link; archived copy made 2 Nov 2026
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council n.d.	Official site	Found; list of Monitoring Team reports confirms S/2026/651 as the newest report
1 Nov 2026	IEP 2026	Official site	Found; Global Terrorism Index 2026, March 2026, data year 2025
1 Nov 2026	ACLED 2025	Official site	Found; dated 27 Mar 2025
1 Nov 2026	ACLED 2026a	Official site	Found; dated 26 Feb 2026
1 Nov 2026	ACLED 2026b	Official site	Found; dated 13 May 2026

Date checked	Key	Route	Status
1 Nov 2026	ACLED 2026c	Official site	Found; dated 5 Jun 2026
1 Nov 2026	ACLED 2026d	Official site	Found; dated 6 Jul 2026
1 Nov 2026	OCHA 2026b	ReliefWeb (OCHA)	Found; as of 9 Sep 2026, posted 10 Sep 2026
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2020	Official MINUSMA site	Found; dated 19 Aug 2020
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2021	Official MINUSMA site	Found; dated 26 May 2021
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2022a	Official site	Found; SC/14790, dated 9 Feb 2022
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2022b	Official site	Found; SC/15057, dated 7 Oct 2022
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2023	Official site	Found; SC/15341, dated 30 Jun 2023
1 Nov 2026	UN Security Council 2024	Official site	Found; SC/15557, dated 5 Jan 2024
1 Nov 2026	UN Secretary-General 2023	Official site	Found; SG/SM/21890, dated 26 Jul 2023
1 Nov 2026	UN News 2023	Official site	Found; dated 31 Dec 2023
1 Nov 2026	Élysée 2022	Official site	Found; French; dated 15 Aug 2022
1 Nov 2026	Ministère des Armées 2023	Official site	Found; French; dated 5 Oct 2023
1 Nov 2026	Présidence du Faso 2024	Official site	Found; French; dateline Niamey, 6 Jul 2024
1 Nov 2026	ECOWAS 2025a	Official site	Found; dated 29 Jan 2025
1 Nov 2026	ECOWAS 2025b	Official site	Found; dated 30 Jan 2025
1 Nov 2026	UAE MoFA 2026a	Official site	Found; dated 5 Feb 2026
1 Nov 2026	UAE MoFA 2026b	Official site	Found; dated 27 Apr 2026
1 Nov 2026	UAE MoFA 2026c	Official site	Found; dated 20 Jun 2026
1 Nov 2026	Niger Government AES final communiqué, 6 Jul 2024	Official site	No readable text; not cited. Burkina Faso presidency release used instead
1 Nov 2026	UN Secretary-General statement on Burkina Faso, 1 Oct 2022	Official site	Unavailable; not cited. Security Council press statement SC/15057 used instead
1 Nov 2026	French armed forces ministry page on the end of Barkhane in Mali	Official site	Unavailable; not cited. Élysée statement used instead

Date checked	Key	Route	Status
1 Nov 2026	Reuters, 31 Oct 2025 and 14 Aug 2026, on the 2025 kidnapping	Official site and Internet Archive	Unavailable (no archived copy); not cited
1 Nov 2026	AES or Malian government statement on the 25 April 2026 offensive	Searched	None found; not cited

Consulted, not cited

- OCHA 2026a: Consulted; superseded by OCHA 2026b.

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